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Abstract
One significant challenge in cognitive radio networks is to design a framework in which the selfish
secondary users are obliged to interact with each other truthfully. Moreover, due to the vulnerability
of these networks against jamming attacks, designing anti-jamming defense mechanisms is equally
important. In this paper, we propose a truthful mechanism, robust against the jamming, for a dynamic
stochastic cognitive radio network consisting of several selfish secondary users and a malicious user. In
this model, each secondary user participates in an auction and wish to use the unjammed spectrum, and
the malicious user aims at jamming a channel by corrupting the communication link. A truthful auction
mechanism is designed among the secondary users. Furthermore, a zero-sum game is formulated between
the set of secondary users and the malicious user. This joint problem is then cast as a randomized two-
level auctions in which the first auction allocates the vacant channels, and then the second one assigns
the remaining unallocated channels. We have also changed this solution to a trustful distributed scheme.
Simulation results show that the distributed algorithm can achieve a performance that is close to the
centralized algorithm, without the added overhead and complexity.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Spectrum scarcity has been a major problem for the existing wireless networks which motivated
researchers to investigate new intelligent paradigm to manage available spectrum. Cognitive
radio (CR) has thus emerged as a promising approach to improve spectral efficiency in wireless
networks. In CR networks, secondary users (SUs) may cognitively access unused spectrum that
is not currently occupied by licensed users, namely primary users (PUs) under the condition that
the PUs’ transmission will not be interfered [1].
Spectrum management in CR networks has been considered in many recent works such as
[2] and [3] (and references therein). One important technique that enables CR-oriented spectrum
allocation is to consider spectrum auction among SUs that seek to idle channels [4]. Auction
theory, which is rooted in economics, offers a promising solution for intelligently allocating
resources, such as power and spectrum, in CR networks. There are different approaches for
implementing auction theory in wireless networks, which have been investigated in [5]. In
general, in such scenarios, users are rational and have their own strategies in order to get more
resources. Extensive existing works are available on different auction approaches for spectrum
allocation (e.g., see [6]). For instance, the authors in [7] find the maximization of the PUs’
expected profit by proposing the leasing based spectrum allocation for SUs. In addition, the
first price auction to optimize both the total payoff of SUs and revenue of auctioneer is studied
in [8]. One drawback of the suggested scheme is that SUs might reveal wrong to further improve
their utilities. The work in [9] provides a spectrum allocation based upon a double-sided auction
mechanism. In this scheme, an untruthful behavior also brings suboptimal solutions.
Competition among the selfish SUs is crucial to use rare resources in the spectrum market
framework [10]. More importantly, non-cooperative users have intentions to cheat so as to gain
more benefits. The Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is commonly used in the
auction games in order to provide not only the assurance of truthfulness but also the maximization
of the social welfare [11]. For example, the authors in [12] and [13] proposed the incentive
mechanism to encourage users to contribute truthfully their resources by forming coalitions.
Moreover, because of selfishness of SUs, each user attending in the auction has incomplete
information about the other users. Hence, selecting a proper learning task is a big challenge for
designing the distributed game. A Bayesian nonparametric belief update scheme is suggested to
3solve this issue in [14].
In CR networks, SUs are susceptible to several malicious attacks. Several anti-attack mecha-
nisms have been proposed in existing literature [15]. For example, the problem of PU emulation
attack on CR networks has been investigated in [16] in which a malicious user can send
signals with the same PU transmission characteristics in order to mislead the SUs. Instead,
SUs can recognize PUs’ transmission by adapting a favorable verification protocol. In addition,
a game-theoretic approach based upon the concept of secrecy capacity is proposed to model
eavesdropping attacks on CR networks in [17]. In [18], a set of SUs is available in a stochastic
medium and they select randomized channel hopping as the defensive strategy. This framework
falls into the category of the zero sum stochastic game and the authors propose a minimax-
Q learning to find the related solution. Besides, the randomized defense strategy for channel
hopping and power allocation with learning algorithms is suggested in [19]. However, in a
spectrum auction, users act selfishly and these defense strategies are not fully applicable.
The main contribution of this paper is to jointly consider truthful spectrum auction and the
presence of a jamming attack. In this scenario, two types of users exist: selfish SUs participating
the auction and a malicious jamming user that wishes to reduce the social welfare as much as
possible. Our key contributions can therefore be summarized as follows:
• To model the mentioned scenario, we formulated two inter-related games: a zero-sum
stochastic game between the CR network and the jammer, and an associated mechanism
design among the SUs at each stage of the game. Indeed, the zero sum game exists between
the CR network and the malicious user, while mechanism design is considered among the
SUs. Using our proposed framework, the SUs do not show their selfishness and at the same
time cooperate with each other to get higher profits against the malicious user.
• In order to realize the joint games, we propose an algorithm based on zero-sum game which
can extensively reduce the complexity of solving the game with an asymmetric number of
actions for the players. The proposition is a basis for the work because the malicious user
and the SUs are unequal in the number of actions.
• Using the derived proposition, we show that the zero-sum stochastic game and spectrum
auction game can be converted to a centralized two-level spectrum auction in which SUs
send their bids to a coordinator and the coordinator confronts against the malicious user.
More specifically, the coordinator initially allocates spectrum to the first level bids, and
4then the remaining spectrum is allocated by the second auction. Indeed, the main idea of
the centralized two-level auction is inspired from the randomized auction which is common
in combinatorial auction theory such as [20] and [21]. However, our considered scenario
significantly differs from those existing works.
• A decentralized method based upon the centralized two-level auction is examined. The
proposed algorithm use the proven interesting properties of the centralized game which
extremely reduces the complexity of the game. Simulation results show that the loss in per-
formance for the decentralized method in comparison with the centralized one is negligible.
• Due to the fact that SUs have no knowledge about the states of other SUs and jammer,
the parameters for the decentralized scheme must be learnt from a proper scheme like the
one proposed in [22]. We propose a Boltzmann-Gibbs algorithm to estimate the unknown
parameters for each users. Simulation results show that this method yields considerable
performance gains. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed decentralized game can be
controlled by learning parameters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II.
In Section III, a centralized algorithm based on a two-level auction is described. In Section IV,
we propose a truthful decentralized method in accordance with the proposed centralized auction.
The simulation results are given in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We consider a CR network consisting of M channels having a slotted-time structure indexed
by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Moreover, the duration of each time-slot is assumed to be Ts. There are
N ≥M SUs that seek to access the vacant channels to send their data. Moreover, these users are
selfish and non-cooperative. The primary network consists of a number of PUs who have a have
priority to use the channels in a slotted-time manner. We consider an on-off scheme to model
the channel usage, in which yj(t) = 1 and yj(t) = 0 indicate that channel j is idle and busy at
time t, respectively [18] and [19]. The transition probabilities from on-to-off and off-to-on are
αN2F,j and αF2N,j , respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that every SU can only
use one channel at time t [23]. In order to avoid the conflict with the PUs transmission, each
SU knows the availability of all the channels before transmitting. This can be done by using
wideband sensing or cooperative sensing techniques [24].
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Fig. 1. The system model including SUs, PUs and a malicious user.
The state of channel j for SU i is assumed to be the received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR)
γij(t), following an exponential distribution with mean of γij . Similar to [25], we represent
γij(t) by discrete states to attain a finite Markov chain. In addition, let bti indicate the buffer
state of user i at time t and bti ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Bmax} where Bmax is the maximum buffer size. Thus,
the state of SU i at time t is si(t) =
(
γi1(t), γi2(t), . . . , γiM(t), b
t
i
)
and the state of the stochastic
game is described as follows:
S(t) =
(
y1(t), . . . , yM(t), s1(t), . . . , sN(t)
)
, (1)
where the state of the game S(t) consists of the state of each SU and the occupancy state of
each channel. The assigned channel to the i-th SU is denoted by Ai(t). Moreover, it is possible
that no channel is assigned to the SU, i.e., Ai(t) = 0. Thus, we have Ai(t) ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}.
Assume there is a malicious attacker in this scenario which attempts to interrupt the com-
munication links of the SUs by inserting interference. The action of malicious user is to jam
L channels chosen from the vacant channels. Indeed, if the malicious user jams channel j,
the communication link is assumed to be disrupted at that time. We assume that the jammer
knows the channel occupancy states at each stage time. For simplicity, we assume L = 1, and
our approach can be extended to L > 1 case. The action of jammer, A0(t) ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M},
6indicates the jammed channel by the attacker. Fig. 1 shows the proposed system model and
illustrates how users occupy the time-frequency resources.
Notice that the availabilities of the channels are only imposed by PUs, and hence, they are
independent of the attacker’s action and SUs’ actions. Consequently, we can now derive the
transition probability of the states as
P
(
S(t+ 1) | S(t), A0(t), A1(t), . . . , AN(t)
)
= (2)
P
(
y1(t+ 1), . . . , yM(t+ 1) | y1(t), . . . , yM(t)
) N∏
i=1
P
(
si(t+ 1) | si(t), A0(t), . . . , AN(t)
)
,
si(t+ 1) includes information about the channels’ conditions and the buffer state. The channel
conditions do not depend on the SUs action. Besides, the buffer state, bi(t + 1), is affected by
the jammer action, A0(t), the action of SU i, Ai(t), and si(t). Hence, we can express the last
term of (2) as
P
(
si(t + 1) | si(t), A0(t), A1(t), . . . , AN(t)
)
= P
(
si(t + 1) | si(t), A0(t), Ai(t)
)
= P
(
bi(t+ 1) | bi(t), A0(t), Ai(t)
)
×
M∏
i=1
P
(
γij(t+ 1) | γij(t)
)
. (3)
We denote the incoming traffic of SU i at time t as f ti where f ti ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∞}. It is assumed
that f ti has the Poisson distribution with the average fi [23]. Moreover, the buffer state is derived
from bi(t+1) = min
(
(bi(t)− gAi,A0(t))
++ f ti , Bmax
)
. Hence, we have the following expression
for its transition probability
P
(
bi(t+ 1) | bi(t), A0(t), Ai(t)
)
= (4)
(fi)xefi
x!
, 0 ≤ x < −(bi(t)− gAi,A0(t))
+ +Bmax,∑∞
x=B
(fi)xe
fi
x!
, x = −
(
bi(t)− gAi,A0(t)
)+
+Bmax,
where (c)+ = max(c, 0) and gAi,A0(t) indicates the transmission bit rate if channel Ai(t) is
selected and channel A0(t) is jammed. Therefore, gAi,A0(t) can be calculated as [32]
gAi,A0(t) =
⌊
TsW log2
(
1 +
1.5γi,j
ln( 0.2BERtar )
)⌋
I(Ai 6= A0), (5)
where Ts, W and BERtar are the time duration, bandwidth of each channel and target bit error
rate, respectively. In (5), ⌊X⌋ and I(Y ) indicate the largest integer number which is lower than
X and the sign of Y , respectively. When the i-th SU selects channel Ai(t) and the jammer selects
7the A0(t)-th channel at the same time, the utility function of user i at time t is characterized as
follows
ri
(
S(t), Ai(t), A0(t)
)
= −
(
bi(t)− gAi,A0(t)− Bmax + f
t
i
)+
. (6)
In our scenario, we consider the presence of a coordinator that allocates spectrum to the SUs
according to the submitted bids while maximizing the worst-case social welfare corrupted by
the attacker. Hence, the interactions between the coordinator and the SUs are cast as an auction
with the following elements:
• The auctionees are the SUs which aim at using the vacant channels.
• The auctioneer is the coordinator which allocates the channels to SUs. Afterwards, the
auctioneer and coordinator are used interchangeably.
• Each bid is denoted by aij,k, where 1 ≤ j, k ≤ M . Here, aij,k indicates the proper bid for
SU i to use channel j while the attacker jams channel k.
• The following constraints must be satisfied at each stage of the auction:
M∑
j=1
zij(t) ≤ 1
∑N
i=1 zij(t) = 1, if channel j is idle,∑N
i=1 zij(t) = 0, if channel j is busy,
(7)
in which zij(t) ∈ {0, 1} shows that channel j is allocated to the i-th SU if zij(t) = 1; and
is not allocated otherwise.
In order to combat the jammer, the coordinator should assign the channels to the SUs via a
random strategy. In the next section, we will investigate this optimal strategy.
III. ANTI-JAMMING DECENTRALIZED GAME BASED ON LEARNING PROCESS
In the previous section, the PC-game is proposed in order to extract the anti-jamming mecha-
nism under the condition that all SUs and the auctioneer act as one player to defeat the malicious
user. However, this assumption may not hold in general since the SUs are selfish and maybe
untruthful. Unreliable information may lead to an improper strategy for protection of the SUs
against the jammer. Besides, the SUs send their M ′2 bids to the coordinator, which has the high
complexity. Due to these drawbacks, this section suggests a decentralized method according to
the framework provided by the PC-game.
8In the PC-game, we use a two level auction, and our aim is to specify a distribution function
to the actions. These actions can be recognized by the first and second preferences of all the
SUs. First, pay attention to p∗T1 Up∗2 =
(∑ N!
(N−M′)!
l=1 p
∗
1,lU
l
)
p∗2 where p∗1 and p∗2 are the optimal
policies of the auctioneer and the jammer, respectively. Moreover, p∗1,l and U l are the l-th entry
of p∗1 and the l-th row of payoff matrix U of the original game in Definition 1. If we extend
each U l into its elements, we have the following formulation:( N!(N−M′)!∑
l=1
p∗1,lU
l
)
p∗2 =
( N∑
i=1
M ′∑
j=1
p∗u(i,j)[ai,j,1, . . . , ai,j,M ′]
)
p∗2, (8)
in which p∗u(i,j) is equal to the probability of selection of the j-th channel for the i-th user.
Every policy, which yields the same p∗u(i,j), is the optimal strategy against the attacker. This fact
motivates us to move from the PC-game to a distributed game. In the PC-game, we specify a
probability to each action distinguished by the first auction or equivalently the first preferences
of the SUs. By truthfulness assumption and help of the mentioned fact, if each SU individually
estimate the probabilities connected with the preferences over the channels, then the value of
the PC-game obtained from (14) can be approximated by the following formulation:
M ′∑
l1=1
. . .
M ′∑
lN=1
Ql1 . . . QlNU l1,...,lNp
∗
2 ≅ p
∗T
1 Up
∗
2, (9)
where Qli and U l1,...,lN are the estimated probability related to the first preference by the i-th
SUand the value of the game when the SUs’s preferences are l1, . . . , lN , respectively.
Each auction consists of M ′ allocations to the SUs. Note that from Proposition 1, we only
need M ′ auctions to reach to the best response against the jammer. Thus, there are at most M ′2
important probabilities, p∗u(i,j), at each stage of game. Moreover, it can be easily demonstrated
that every policy, which has these M ′2 probabilities, is optimal from the perspective of the
zero-sum game. On the other side, each SU has control over M ′ probabilities for stating its
first preference over the channels. From this point of view, the SUs have N ×M ′ variables for
estimations of M ′2 important probabilities which are improved with increasing N compared to
M .
At this time, by applying the auction feature to the game, the coordinator can get payments
from the SUs. The payment of each SU is constructed from two parts. One payment part is related
9to the first-auction and the other part is associated with the second-auction. The computation
approach of the payment for the first-auction which is similar to [23]is stated as
pti =
N∑
(k=1,k 6=i)
M ′∑
j=1
zt,optkj a
′
kj(t)− max
(zkj |a
′
ij=0,∀j)
N∑
(k=1,k 6=i)
M ′∑
j=1
ztkja
′
kj(t), (10)
in which zt,optkj is the solution of the first auction. For the second-auction, this payment can also
be computed by the same procedure while the selected SUs in the first-auction and their corre-
sponding announced bids are omitted by the coordinator. The PD-game procedure is described
in Table I. We show these payments oblige the SUs to bid truthfully. In order to prove that
the proposed distributed game (PD-game) contains the truthful mechanism, first we define the
concept of truthfulness in expectation.
Definition 1: Assume vi, v′i, v−i and pti are the real value of bid for user i, the announced
value of bid for user i, the value of bids for other users and the payment assigned to user i,
respectively. A mechanism is truthful in expectation when for any user i and any v−i ∈ V−i
of other users, the expectation of profit attained by user i, E{vi′ − pti(vi′, v−i)} is maximum if
v′i = vi [28].
We now focus on a proposition which states that the PD-game is truthfulness in expectation.
Proposition 1: The proposed procedure for assigning payment satisfies truthfulness in the
expectation criterion.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
Note that the payment of each SU, which is dependent on all the SUs’ bids, converts the
profit gained by each SU into a notion of the overall value of the zero-sum game. Thus, we are
trying to model the game between each SU and the attacker as the zero-sum game separately
so that the separate game for each SU has some external factors related to other SUs, and each
SU is effective only on a certain amount of the profit.
By doing so, every SU computes the distribution of stating its preference over the channels.
In addition, the communication burden of stating its bids obviously plummets. Since, the SU
only sends M ′ bids instead of stating M ′2. Duties of the coordinator decreases since it only
computes the first and second-auctions and their related payments. Indeed, the utility matrix of
the separate game between each SU and the attacker is modeled as a (M ′×M ′) matrix because
the SU has M ′ choices for the announcement of its first preference. Note that our algorithm
is distinct from work suggested in [30] in which authors employ a factored approximation of
10
TABLE I
THE PROPOSED DECENTRALIZED GAME
Step 1. The SUs submit the bid based upon (12) to the coordinator. At the same time, the SUs announce their preferences over
channels in order to be used in the first and second auctions.
Step 2. First auction is computed for the first preferences of the SUs. Then, allocation and payment for each SU is assigned to
them by using (7) and (16).
Step 3. Similarly, the second auction is computed for the remaining channels and the SUs.
the overall Q-function based upon the linear combination of users’ Q-function for the stochastic
game. The proposed algorithm is not applicable in our scenario because the SUs are selfish and
interested in benefiting further. Indeed, the payment structure makes the profit of SUs’ network
directly relevant to each individual profit due to Proposition 3. Instead, p∗1 is estimated by SUs’
probabilities, Ql1 , . . . , QlN .
The fundamental difficulty of the PD-game is that each SU does not know enough about
its related separate utility matrix. Remembering that the game will be repeated infinitely, and
therefore, the SUs can learn their utilities by a certain learning scheme. We employ the scheme
proposed in [22]. The advantage of this scheme is that each SU can adapt different patterns
of learning. The probabilistic strategy over the actions and utility of each stage can be learned
through the game. First, we apply an iterative Boltzmann-Gibbs strategy which is stated as
σi
(
qt1i, û1i,t,S(t)
)
(j) =
qt1i
(
j,S(t)
)
e
û1i,t
(
j,S(t)
)
ǫ∑M ′
j=1 q
t
1i
(
j,S(t)
)
e
û1i,t
(
j,S(t)
)
ǫ
(11)
where qt1i
(
j,S(t)
)
and û1i,t are distribution of selecting channel j as the first preference of SU
i and the estimated average payoffs updated at iteration t, respectively [22]. Next, we update
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distribution and payoff, respectively, as
q
(t+1)
1i
(
S(t)
)
= (1− λ1i,t)q
t
1i
(
S(t)
)
+ λ1i,tσi
(
qt1i, û1i,t,S(t)
)
(j) (12)
û1i,t+1
(
S(t)
)
= û1i,t
(
S(t)
)
+
µ1i,t
qt1i
(
j,S(t)
)(U1i,t(S(t))− û1i,t(S(t))). (13)
in which U1i,k,t is the profit gained by SU i at time t when selecting channel j as its preference,
which is zero when no channel is assigned to it, and is a′ij,k− pi(t) when channel j is assigned.
Furthermore, µ1i,t and λ1i,t are the learning rates indicating players’ capabilities of information
retrieval and update. Therefore, each SU can learn the distribution over its preference from
implementing a Q-learning based method. It can be proved that Q-learning method converges
to the optimal solution for only single-agent case; However, there is no such a guarantee for
multi-agent cases [29]. In the next section, simulation results illustrate the convergence of the
PD-game to the sub-optimal solutions.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to verify the truthful anti-jamming network. We
consider a cognitive radio environment with M channels, N secondary users and a malicious user.
We assume that the state of signal to noise ratio for SU i and channel j, γij , has three values 10, 30
and 50. The probability of state transitions from these states are p(γij = 10|γ1ij = 10) = 0.4,
p(γij = 30|γ
1
ij = 10) = 0.3, p(γij = 10|γ
1
ij = 30) = 0.3, p(γij = 30|γ
1
ij = 30) = 0.4,
p(γij = 10|γ
1
ij = 50) = 0.3, and p(γij = 30|γ1ij = 50) = 0.3. In addition, αN2F,j = 0.3 and
αF2N,j = 0.4 for 1 ≤ j ≤M . We set also BERtar for all the users in (5) as 10−5.
A. Convergence
The convergence speed of the PC-game and the PD-game for three SUs are investigated in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 when M = 2 and M = 3, respectively. Besides, Bmax = 2 and fi = 0.5 for
all SUs for the either case. The normalized cumulative value of SUs is used as a convergence
comparison tool. As Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 report, both algorithms converge; however, the PD-game
takes longer time to reach the stable solution. The PD-game is done in the decentralized scheme
with incomplete information. Therefore, it needs more times to learn the unknown parameters.
12
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Fig. 2. The convergence of the normalized cumulative value of SUs in the PD-game and PC-game in a networks with M = 2
and N = 3.
In particular, the convergence rates in Fig. 3 for both the PC-game and PD-game are quite slower
than those in Fig. 2. Indeed, increase in M leads to rises in the numbers of the states and the
complexity of the system. Consequently, the required numbers of iterations in Fig. 3 explicitly
becomes greater.
The learning parameters λ1i,t, µ1i,t and ǫ in (17), (18) and (19) play important roles in the
convergence of the PD-game. In [22], it is shown that λ1i,t
µ1i,t
→ 0 for assurance of the convergence.
Hence, we consider λ1i,t
µ1i,t
=
1
T
(1+β)
S
1
TS
where Ts is the repetition numbers of state occurrence, where
β > 0. Fig. 4 depicts the effect of different β and ǫ on the iterations required for the convergence
under the mentioned condition when M = 2. It is clear that when these parameters increase,
the convergence speed decrease, since the impact of instantaneous utilities on current strategy
decreases.
B. The effects of SU parameters on performance
In this part, the effects of the maximum allowable Bmax, the number of channels M , and the
number of users N on the PD-game and the PC-game are evaluated. In order to have a similar
13
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Fig. 3. The convergence of the normalized cumulative value of SUs in the PD-game and PC-game in a networks with M = 3
and N = 3.
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Fig. 4. The effect of different β and ǫ on the performance of the PD-game.
benchmark for comparison of two methods, we define a new parameter θ based on (6) as,
θ =
∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
−ri(t)/N.
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Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 illustrate the performance of the PC-game and the PD-game by θ for variable
Bmax and N when M = 2 and M = 3, respectively. The other parameters are set alike to the
previous part. In Fig. 5, the SU with the greater Bmax is able to hold the data for a longer time.
Thus, the increment in Bmax decreases θ. In other words, it can improve the performance of the
system. However, increase in N has opposite impact on the θ which is result of increasing the
dropping probability of data. Moreover, Fig. 6 shows the performance when M = 3. Note that
both the PC-game and PD-game in Fig. 6 have lower θ rather than those in Fig. 5 for the same
condition. Indeed, M = 3 increases the opportunities of available vacant channels for each SU;
therefore, decreases the numbers of unsent buffered information.
The performance of the scenario for different average of incoming traffic fi and the numbers of
SUs is shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. The results are obtained for M = 2 and M = 3, respectively.
Rise in fi means that the average of incoming traffic increase. The outcome of the rise is to
receive more traffic data at each stage of the game; as a result, the average unsent traffic θ
increase. Finally, Fig. 9 displays θ versus fi when N = M . Notice that increase in N along with
M causes θ to be lower which validates our discussion about the performance of the scheme.V. CONCLUSION
Spectrum management among the SUs is a vital issue for CR networks, and auction theory
provides a helpful tool to allocate spectrum to SUs. In this article, first, we proposed a centralized
15
2 3 4 50
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
BMax
θ
 
 
PC−game, N=3
PD−game, N=3
PC−game, N=4
PD−game, N=4
PC−game, N=5
PD−game, N=5
PC−game, N=6
PD−game, N=6
N=6
N=5
N=4
N=3
Fig. 6. The effect of different Bmax and N for M = 3 on the performance of the PD-game.
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two-level auction which combined both the advantages of efficient resource assignment to SUs
and acting against the malicious user. Next, a proposition for the zero-sum game was given which
can be applied in a game with the non-uniform number of users’ actions. More importantly,
we introduced a decentralized protocol based upon the centralized method properties and the
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mentioned proposition. The decentralized scheme obliges SUs to bid truthfully because SUs can
gain higher profit in expectation for the long-term interaction. Simulation studies show that both
the centralized and decentralized scheme converge in the limited numbers of stages. Moreover,
the performance of the proposed approach are comparable with the efficient centralized solution.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider a zero-sum game with payoff matrix O as follows
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O =

o1,1 · · · o1,l2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ol1,1 · · · ol1,l2

(14)
in which on,m shows that player 1 and player 2 obtain on,m and −on,m profitwhen they select
their n-th and m-th actions, respectively. To attain the optimal solution [26], we should consider
mixed strategy with the help of the following equation:
max
p1
min
p2
pT1Op2 = min
p2
max
p1
pT1Op2 = v (15)
where p1 and p2 indicate the probability distributions over the related actions of player 1 and
player 2, and v is the value of the game. Moreover, O can be expressed as,
O =
[
oT1 ,o
T
2 , . . . ,o
T
l1
]T
where oi is 1× l2 vector for i ∈ (1, . . . , l1). Hence, v1 = pT1O =
∑N
i=1 p1,ioi and v= v1p2. In
addition, we consider all the entries of matrix are more than zero. The value of the game, which
contains l1 actions with vectors o1, . . . ,ol1 , is denoted by zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1). First, we state
a lemma in order to prove the proposition.
Lemma 1: If the following relationship exists between o1, . . . ,ol1 , player 1 can play the
game without the l1-th action while it gets the same value,
ol1 = λ1o1 + λ2o2 + . . .+ λl1−1ol1−1
l1−1∑
i=1
λi = 1, −∞ < λi <∞, ∀i. (16)
Proof: First, assume that player 1 has optimal probabilities p∗1,1, . . . , p∗1,l1−1 over o1, . . . ,ol1−1,
respectively. Equation (22) can be rewritten by the following representation,
ol1 =
((((
(h11o1 + h12o2)h21 + h22o3
)
h31 + h32o4
)
+ . . .
)
hl1−2,1 + hl1−2,2ol1−1
)
,
where the following relationships exist between the set of hk,1s and hk,2s
hk,1 + hk,2 = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ l1 − 2.
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Moreover, we have the next equations between {hk,1, hk,2} and {λk} for 1 ≤ k ≤ l1 − 2,
hl1−2,2 = λl1−1, hl1−2,1 = 1− λl1−1,
hl1−3,2(hl1−2,1) = λl1−2, hl1−3,1 = 1− hl1−3,2,
. . . . . .
h2,2
∏l1−2
i=3 hi,1 = λ3, h2,1 = 1− h2,2
h1,2
∏l1−2
i=2 hi,1 = λ2, h1,1
∏l1−2
i=2 hi,1 = λ1.
(17)
Afterwards, we introduce a game containing l1 actions with vectors o1, . . . ,ol1−1 and o′l1 =
h1,1o1+h1,2o2. Besides, the optimal probabilities of the new game are assumed as q∗1,1, . . . , q∗1,l1−1
and q′∗1l1 . The value of game to which the l1-th action is added is not less than the game without
the l1-th action according to [31], meaning that,
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) ≤ zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h11o1 + h12o2). (18)
In other words, for the new game, we have the following results,
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) ≤ zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h11o1 + h12o2)
= min
v
(q∗11o1 + . . .+ q
∗
1,l1−1
ol1−1 + q
′∗
1l1
o
′
l1
)
= min
v
((q∗11 + h11q
′∗
1l1
)o1 + (q
∗
12 + h12q
′∗
1l1
)o2 + . . .+ q
∗
1,l1−1
ol1−1),
where minv finds the entry with the minimum value of vector v. If both h1,1 and h1,2 are not less
than zero, set (q∗11 + h1,1, q∗12 + h1,2, . . . , q∗1,l1−1) can be interpreted as a distribution vector over
l1 − 1 actions of player 1. Notice that each probability distribution over these selected actions
brings the value not greater than v. Thus, we can conclude that
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) ≥ zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h11o1 + h12o2). (19)
Due to (24) and (25), we have
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h11o1 + h12o2). (20)
In other words, if the action l1 with vector o
′
l1
= h1,1o1 + h1,2o2 is eliminated, we will gain the
same value. However, if one of them is less than zero, we cannot get the above formulation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that h1,1 < 0 and −α = q∗11 + h1,1q
′∗
1l1
< 0. Remind that
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h1,1 + h1,2 = 1, thus h1,2 > 0 and therefore q∗1,2 + h1,2q
′∗
1,l1
> 0 . Because the summation over
probabilities is 1, hence,
l1−1∑
i=1
q∗1,i + q
′∗
1,l1 = 1
(q∗1,1 + h1,1q
′∗
1l1) + (q
∗
1,2 + h1,2q
′∗
1l1) + . . .+ q
∗
1,(l1−1) = 1,
(q∗1,2 + h1,2q
′∗
1,l1
) + · · ·+ q∗1,(l1−1) = 1 + α.
Now, consider distribution vector [T2, T3, . . . , Tl1−1] which is constructed by the following,
(q∗1,2+h1,2q
′
∗
1,l1
)
(1+α)
= T2
q∗1,3
(1+α)
= T3
. . .
q∗
1,(l1−1)
(1+α)
= Tl1−1
(21)
where T2 + T3 + · · ·+ Tl1−1 = 1. Again, we have the following inequality:
min
v
(o2T2 + . . .+ ol1−1Tl1−1) ≤ zerosum(o2, . . . ,ol1−1) ≤ zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1). (22)
To put it differently, (28) can be reformulated as
min
v
(
o2p
∗
12 + · · ·+ ol1−1p
∗
1(l1−1)
1− p∗11
)
≤ zerosum(o2, . . . ,ol1−1) ≤ zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1).
Besides, (24) gives that
min
v
(
(1 + α)(o2T2 + · · ·+ ol1−1Tl1−1)− αo1
)
> zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1),
and,
min
v
((
o2p
∗
12 + · · ·+ ol1−1p
∗
1(l1−1)
1− p∗11
)
(1− p∗11) + p
∗
11o1
)
> zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1).
If bk, ck and dk are the k-th the entries of (o2T2+ · · ·+ol1−1Tl1−1),
(
o2p
∗
12+···+ol1−1p
∗
1(l1−1)
1−p∗11
)
and
o1, respectively, we could obtain the following result,
bk >
dk
α + 1
+
zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1)
α + 1
>
α(zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1)− p
∗
11ck)
(α + 1)(1− p∗11)
+
α(zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1))
α+ 1
=
zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1)
(
α
(1 + α)(1− p∗11)
+
1
α + 1
)
−
αp∗11)ck
(1 + α)(1− p∗11)
. (23)
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Consequently,
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1)
(
α
(1 + α)(1− p∗11)
+
1
α + 1
)
<
αp∗11ck
(1 + α)(1− p∗11)
. (24)
This suggests the following inequality for bk, ck and dk
w1ck + w2bk > dk st. w1 + w2 = 1. (25)
Therefore, consideration of both (30) and (31) gives us the following inequality,
zerosum
(
o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1
)
<
min
v
(
w1
(
o2p
∗
12 + · · ·+ ol1−1p
∗
1,l1−1
1− p∗11
)
+ w2(o2T2 + · · ·+ ol1−1Tl1−1)
)
= min
v
(β2o2 + · · ·+ βl1−1ol1−1) (26)
in which β2+ β3+ · · ·+ βl1−1 = 1 , β2, β3 ,. . . , βl1−1 ≥ 0. We know that the minimum entry of
vector β2o2 + · · ·+ βl1−1ol1−1 is not higher than zerosum(o1,o2, . . . ,ol1−1) for any set of β2,
β3 ,. . . , βl1−1. Therefore, our initial assumption is not correct. In other words, q∗1,1 + h1,1q
′∗h1,l1
is not less than zero, and we can obviate o′l1 . It means that
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h1,1o1 + h1,2o2). (27)
Returning to the general case in (22), it can be concluded from (33) that
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
= h1,1o1 + h1,2o2) =
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,o
′
l1
, h2,2o3 + h2,1o
′
l1
) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1, h2,2o3 + h2,1o
′
l1
) =
zerosum
(
o1, . . . ,ol1−1, h22o3 + h21o
′
l1
, h3,1(h2,2o3 + h2,1o
′
l1
) + h3,2o4
)
= . . . =
zerosum
(
o1, . . . ,ol1−1, h31(h22o3 + h21o
′
l1
) + h32o4
)
=
zerosum
((((
(h11o1 + h12o2)h21 + h22o3
)
h31 + h32o4
)
+ . . .
)
h(l1−2)1 + h(l1−2)2ol1−1
)
=
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1−1,ol1). (28)
The expression in (34) states that if ol1 satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1, we can omit it.
Here, we return to prove Proposition 1. Each oi has l2 entries, so we can represent all of the l1
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vectors by at most l2 vectors of them. These basic vectors are linear and independent. Without
loss of generality, we assume that these vectors are o1, . . . ,ol′2, where l
′
2 ≤ l2. Based upon the
vector representation, all {oi}s are classified into three groups.
Now, we assume that each oi can be displayed by oi = λ1,io1 + · · · + λl′2,iol′2 . Also, the
coefficients are unique due to linearity and independency. These groups are stated as follows:
Group I: If
∑l′2
j=1 λj,i = 1, we can obviate oi and get the same value as in Lemma 1.
Group II: If
∑l′2
j=1 λj,i < 1, we have the following facts:
We assume that the optimal probability distributions over the l1 actions are p∗1,1, . . . , p∗1,l1 .
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1) ≥ zerosum(o1, . . . ,oi−1,oi+1, . . . ,ol1)
where the second term does not include oi. From [26], we know that
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1) = min
v
(p∗1,1o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1,l1
ol1). (29)
Now, we extend (35) as
p∗1,1o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1,ioi + · · ·+ p
∗
1,l1
ol1 = p
∗
1,1o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1,i(λ1io1 + · · ·+ λl′2iol′2) + · · ·+ p
∗
1,l1
ol1
< p∗1,1o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1,i(λ1,io1 + · · ·+ λl′2iol′2) + · · ·+ p
∗
1,l1ol1 +
(
1−
l′2−1∑
j=1
λji − λl′2i
)
ol′2
= p∗1,1o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1,i
(
λ1,io1 +
(
1−
l′2−1∑
j=1
λi,j
)
ol′2
)
+ . . .+ p∗1,l1ol1
in which we call the expression stated in parenthesis in the last term as o′i. The value of the
game when playing with o′i instead of oi is given via
zerosum(o1, . . . ,o
′
i, . . . ,ol1) ≥ min(p
∗
11o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1io
′
i + · · ·+ p
∗
1l1
ol1) >
min(p∗11o1 + · · ·+ p
∗
1l1
ol1) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1).
Now, oi can be represented by basic vectors {o1, . . . ,o
′
i, . . . ,ol1} in which the sum of coefficients
becomes 1. Thus, we can obviate o′i and at the same time get the same value. In other words,
we have
zerosum(o1, . . . ,oi−1,o
′
i,oi+1, . . . ,ol1) = zerosum(o1, . . . ,oi−1,oi+1, . . . ,ol1).
Moreover, we have
zerosum(o1, . . . ,ol1) ≥ zerosum(o1, . . . ,oi−1,oi+1, . . . ,ol1).
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Then, we can remove all of vectors which have coefficients satisfying the following inequality
without loss in the value of the game, v.
l′2∑
j=1
λji < 1. (30)
Group III: If
∑l′2
j=1 λji > 1, we can show oi by the following equation
oi = λ1,io1 + λ2,io2 + · · ·+ λl2′ ,iol′2−1. (31)
In this case, there exists at least one coefficient, e.g., λl′2,i, which is greater than zero. Now, we
try to show ol′2 by o1, . . . ,ol′2−1 including oi. Indeed,
ol′2 =
−(λ1io1 + λ2io2 + · · ·+ λl′2−1iol′2−1)
λl′2i
+
1
λl′2i
oi = µ1o1 + µ2o2 + · · ·+ µl′2−1ol′2−1.
However, we know that
µ1 + · · ·+ µl′2−1 =
−(λ1i + λ2i + · · ·+ λl2′−1,i) + 1
λl′2i
> 1. (32)
Therefore, we can remove o
l2
′ according to the second group. As a result, we only need the l2
actions among the l1 onesand get the same value. Similar classification can be applied to vectors
of o1, . . . ,ol1 and at each stage one vector is removed. Finally, l′2(l′2 6 l2) actions (vectors)
remain for playing the game.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
First, we consider an assumption for each allocation to continue our proof.
Assumption 1: If the following relation exist between vectors of allocations, {h1,h2, . . . ,hM ′,
hM ′+1},
M ′∑
i=1
λihi = hM ′+1,
M ′∑
i=1
λi = 1, (33)
for 1 ≤ i ≤M ′ + 1, EL{hi} * EL{h1, . . . ,hi−1,hi+1, . . . ,hM ′+1},
then the occurrence probability of all relations is zero.
Indeed, each hi has M ′ entries. Accordingly, the allocation vectors construct M ′ equations,
and we have M ′ − 1 parameters involving λ1, . . . , λM ′−1. For (39), we have M ′ − 1 parameters
satisfying M ′ equations. This situation makes hard to yield these M ′ − 1 parameters out of
M ′ equations. For instance, if each aij,k is independent with respect to the other ai′j′,k′ with
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the uniform distribution, this assumption is precise. Also, our simulation result certifies the
assumption. We assume that the attackers strategy is the same as the strategy of the original
zero-sum game. In the original form, we have the following equation
p∗T1 Up
∗
2 = max
p1
min
p2
pT1Up2,
Up∗2 =

u1
. . .
u N!
(N−M′)!
 ,
in which p∗1 and p∗2 are the optimal action probabilities of the coordinator and attacker,
respectively, and U is the payoff matrix in accordance with the zero-sum game between the
coordinator and the attacker.
The related ui’s to the allocations with the non-zero probabilities, which are named as the
proper allocations, are the same as the overall value of the game and max(u1, . . . ,u N!
(N−M′)!
).
According to Proposition 1, we only need M ′ proper allocations, namely complete allocations,
to obtain the similar value when using all actions. Hence, we must show that each complete
allocation is surely selected as the solution of the PC-game at least one action by means of
contradiction. Notice that if more than one proper allocations exist in the first-auction, only
one of them is randomly selected as the solution of auction. Furthermore, we know that each
allocation of channels can be found M ′(N−M ′) times at the first auction. The worst case occurs
for a complete allocation, for example J , when at least one of the other proper allocations
always exists in the first auction including this allocation. For simplicity, we assume that J is
(1, 2, . . . ,M ′). Now, consider the following first auctions:
1 : (1, 2, . . . ,M ′, 1, . . . , 1)
2 : (1, 2, . . . ,M ′, 2, . . . , 2)
. . .
M ′ : (1, 2, . . . ,M ′,M ′, . . . ,M ′)
(34)
where (1, 2, . . . ,M ′, j, . . . , j) means that this first-auction includes allocation J , and the co-
ordinator selects channel j for the remaining users as well. Hence, we have at least M ′ + 1
proper allocations among the above actions. These vectors cannot be linearly independent since
dimension of vectors is M ′. Therefore, we have the following according to Proposition 1.
J = λ1ho1 + λ2ho2 + . . .+ λM ′hoM′ λ1 + . . .+ λM ′ = 1, (35)
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where hois are the proper allocations. Also, any two allocations of M ′ + 1 allocations differ
from two elements so that the conditions of Assumption 1 are satisfied, and the probability of
this occurrence is zero. Hence, our initial assumption about the concurrent existence of these
allocations, is not correct and the PC-game is equal to the original game.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In the PD-game, payment for user i has two parts, pi,1 and pi,2, which are related to first and
second auctions. If we assume that the SUs choose preferences l1, . . . , lN as their actions and
channel j is dedicated to the i-th SU while the attacker jams channel h, we have the following
formulation for the average profit of SU i.
E
(
vi − p
t
i1(v̂i, v−i)− p
t
i2(v̂i, v−i) | l1, . . . , lN
)
= aij,hQ2,h(t) +
M ′∑
h=1
([ N∑
k=1,k 6=i
zt,optklk a
′
klk(t)− max
Z|aij′=0∀j
′
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
ztklka
′
klk(t)
])
Q2,h(t)
+
M ′∑
h=1
[ N∑
k=1,k 6=i,k∈S1
M ′∑
j′=1,j′∈S2
zt,optkj′ a
′
kj′(t)− max
Z|aij′=0∀j
′
N∑
k=1,k 6=i,k∈S1
M ′∑
j′=1,j′∈S2
ztkj′a
′
kj′(t)
]
Q2,h(t)).(36)
In (42), vi and v̂i are the actual and submitted bid for SU i. Moreover, Q2,h, S1 and S2 are
the probability for jamming of channel h by the jammer, the set of SUs and channels remained
from first auction, respectively. To attain the i-th user’s profit, we should apply the probability of
preferences for all the SUs. Moreover, p2(t) ≅ Q2(t), therefore,
∑
hQ2,h(t)aij,h = a
′
ij similar
to (12). Hence, the expectation profit can be stated as follows,
E
(
vi − p
t
i(vi, v−i)
)
=
M ′∑
o1=1
Ql1
M ′∑
o2=1
. . .
M ′∑
oN=1
Ql2 . . . QlN
[ N∑
k=1
zt,optklk a
′
klk(t)− max
Z|aij′=0∀j
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
ztklka
′
klk(t)
]
+
[
N∑
k=1,k 6=i,
k∈S1
M ′∑
j=1,j 6=j′
j∈S2
zt,optkj a
′
kj(t)− max
Z|aij=0∀j
N∑
k=1
k∈S1
M ′∑
j=1,
j∈S2
ztkja
′
kj(t)
]
. (37)
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Equivalently,
E
(
vi − p
t
i(vi, v−i)
)
=
M ′∑
o1=1
Ql1
M ′∑
o2=1
. . .
M ′∑
oN=1
Ql2 . . . QlN
[ N∑
k=1
zt,optklk a
′
klk(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+
N∑
k=1,k 6=i
k∈S1
M ′∑
j=1,j 6=j′
j∈S2
zt,optkj a
′
kj(t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
]
−
[
max
Z|aij′=0∀j
N∑
k=1
k 6=i
ztklka
′
klk(t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
+ max
Z|aij=0∀j
N∑
k=1
k∈S1
M ′∑
j=1
j∈S2
ztkja
′
kj(t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
]
. (38)
The third and fourth terms are not function of the i-th SU. Therefore, we can disregard them
to further analysis. But, the summation over the first and second terms are equal to the total
profit of the SUs according to (15). In other words, the individual profit is equivalent to the total
profit. For this reason, the rational SUs must bid truthfully.
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